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Cooperative or competitive? Private regulators and public
supervisors in the post-crisis European financial services
landscape§
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a University of Groningen, The Netherlands
b Groningen Centre for European Financial Services Law, The Netherlands
Abstract
This article explores the interplay between private regulators and public supervisors within principles-based regulation and
meta-regulation in the post-crisis European retail financial services landscape. It shows that the way in which the compliance with
such regulatory frameworks is supervised and enforced may determine the type of relationship between private regulators and
public supervisors – cooperative or competitive – that prevails at a specific moment in time. While there is evidence of both
cooperation and competition between the two in the post-crisis era, a predominantly competitive relationship between private
regulators and public watchdogs may severely undermine the practical importance of co-governance arrangements. A significant
degree of cooperation between private regulators and public supervisors is key to ensuring their effectiveness. Public supervision
and enforcement must therefore be responsive to the peculiarities of co-governance arrangements.
# 2016 Policy and Society Associates (APSS). Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
Financial services, such as payment, credit, investment, and insurance, have become a critical element of modern
European societies. Financial services allow citizens to meet their essential needs, such as having a home or sufficient
income after retirement, and to fully participate in society. In mobilising savings and allocating investment, financial
services are also highly important for the EU economy. A single market in financial services would act as a catalyst for
economic growth and provide lower prices and better quality goods and services for consumers.1
While initially the European financial industry played a major role in the regulation of financial services across the
EU, the last three decades or more have witnessed the rise of public regulation in this area. This trend received a major
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boost in the aftermath of the global financial crisis that was triggered by the collapse of the subprime mortgage market
in the US in 2007.2 According to the now prevailing policy stance, the crisis exposed the risks that the lack of public
regulation in the financial services field can pose not only to individual consumers but also to the proper functioning of
the financial markets and economy at large.3 A frequently mentioned example in this context is widespread
irresponsible lending in the largely unregulated US subprime mortgage.
However, it would be misleading to conclude from this that, in the post-crisis era, to use the words of the former
French president Nicolas Sarkozy, ‘[s]elf-regulation as a way of solving all problems is finished.’4 Private regulation in
the financial services field has not been entirely displaced by public regulation in the post-crisis European financial
services landscape.5 Contrary to the traditional dichotomy between self-regulation by private actors and command and
control regulation by public actors, there is still room for the interplay between the two in governing financial services
in a multi-level EU legal order.6 The regulatory styles that enable such an interplay include, in particular, principles-
based regulation and meta-regulation (or management-based regulation) which are familiar from before the crisis and
remain on the agenda in the post-crisis EU.7 In fact, the interface between the financial services industry and financial
regulators is necessary in the post-crisis era, given that the financial services sector remains a ‘decentred’ regulatory
space8 that is characterised, inter alia, by a high degree of complexity, fragmentation of knowledge, resources and
capacity for control, as well as unpredictability of actor behaviour.
When co-governing public goods, such as financial services, public and private actors may cooperate or compete
with each other.9 As will be illustrated in this article, which form of the relationship between the two prevails at a
specific moment in time may be considerably influenced by the way in which the compliance of private actors with
principles-based regulation or meta-regulation is supervised and enforced by public watchdogs.10 The interplay
between private regulators and public supervisors in the financial services field is particularly interesting in the present
context, given the general post-crisis trend towards strengthening public supervision and enforcement in this area
across the EU. In particular, with the establishment of a new institutional framework for financial supervision – the
European System of Financial Supervision (ESFS), the post-crisis era has witnessed a major move towards a greater
Europeanisation and centralisation of public supervision in the financial services field. The ESFS is formed of the three
sectoral European Supervisory Authorities (ESAs) – the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA), the
European Banking Authority (EBA) and the European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority (EIOPA) – plus
the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) and national supervisory authorities. In particular, the ESAs avail
themselves of far-reaching powers to govern the financial services industry. This can be illustrated by using the
example of ESMA, whose mission is to enhance investor protection and to reinforce stable and well functioning
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the Debate’, Journal of European Integration 36 (2014) 195, 196 et seq.
3 See, for example, Financial Services Authority (FSA), ‘The Turner Review. A Regulatory Response to the Global Financial Crisis’, available at:
http://www.fsa.gov.uk. This view, however, is not shared by all commentators. For the post-crisis defence of free financial markets and self-
regulation, see, for example, J. Allison, The Financial Crisis and the Free Market Cure: Why Pure Capitalism is the World Economy’s Only Hope
(New York: McGraw Hill, 2012); E.P. Stringham, Private Governance: Creating Order in Economic and Social Life (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2015).
4 ‘‘‘Laissez-faire’’ capitalism is finished, says France’, EU Observer, 26 September 2008, https://euobserver.com/political/26814.
5 On this is more detail, see O.O. Cherednychenko, ‘Public and Private Financial Regulation in the EU: Opposites or Complements?’, in N. Dorn
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Kluwer Law International, 2011), 91, 100 et seq.
7 Cf. J. Black, ‘Regulatory Styles and Supervisory Strategies’, in N. Moloney et al. (Eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Financial Regulation (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2015), 218.
8 J. Black, ‘Critical Reflections on Regulation’, Australian Journal of Legal Philosophy 27 (2002) 1; J. Black, ‘Mapping the Contours of
Contemporary Financial Services Regulation’, Journal of Corporate Law Studies 2 (2002) 253; J. Black, ‘Enrolling Actors in Regulatory Systems:
Examples from UK Financial Services Regulation’, Public Law (spring) (2003) 63.
9 See J. Tosun, S. Koos & J. Shore, ‘Co-Governing Common Goods: Interaction Patterns of Private and Public Actors’, in this Special Issue.
10 Cf. J. Black, ‘The Rise, Fall and Fate of Principles-Based Regulation’, in K. Alexander & N. Moloney, Law Reform & Financial Markets
(Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2011) 3, 10.
financial markets in the EU. While its predecessor – the Committee of European Securities Regulators (CESR) – was a
network-based advisory body, ESMA’s powers reach much further.11 In particular, ESMA is conferred with
considerable powers to adopt technical standards implementing the legislative measures of a more general character
and to issue ‘strong’ guidelines and recommendations with which local supervisory authorities and financial
institutions are required to ‘make every effort to comply’.12 In addition, ESMA has direct supervisory powers over
market actors, including the power temporarily to prohibit or restrict certain financial activities, as specified in relevant
EU legislation, and extensive powers to gather information concerning financial supervision practices from local
supervisory authorities. In fact, the rise of public supervision over private relationships between financial service
providers and their (potential) clients at EU and Member State level has led to the emergence of ‘European supervision
private law’. This body of rules is made up of contract-related conduct of business rules for financial institutions,
which are cast as supervision standards and are further elaborated and enforced by financial regulators.13
Against this background, in this article I will explore the interplay between private regulators and public
supervisors in the context of post-crisis European retail financial services law. How private regulators and public
supervisors interact with each other will be discussed with the focus on two forms of public regulation that enable such
an interface – principles-based regulation and meta-regulation. The concept of private regulation is thus understood
here in a broad sense, encompassing the rules for private actors that are produced and/or enforced not only by such
actors themselves alone, but also by private actors in cooperation with public actors, with varying degrees of the
latter’s involvement.14 Throughout the analysis, I will use some prominent examples from the Netherlands and the UK
to illustrate the interplay between private regulators and public supervisors. I will conclude with some final
observations concerning the patterns of such an interplay and the way forward for the co-governance of retail financial
services in the EU.
2. Principles-based regulation
Although there is no uniform definition of principles-based regulation, this regulatory strategy is generally
associated with open-ended standards. A standard is open-ended when its content is not specified in detail by the
legislator. In practice, such standards are further elaborated upon by public and/or private actors. In the EU law
context, the involvement of private actors in this process is often referred to as co-regulation. Under co-regulation, EU
public regulation typically defines mandatory open norms or minimum standards, while EU and/or national private
regulation further specifies or raises them.15 The involvement of private actors in standard-setting and/or enforcement
may be explicitly mandated by the EU public regulation (formal co-regulation),16 or be (strongly) encouraged,17 or
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simply not precluded (informal co-regulation). In any case, private regulation contributes to the attainment of the
specific objectives of the EU public regulation. In the UK, for example, where principles-based regulation is as much a
supervisory strategy as a rule-making technique, in the aftermath of the crisis the label ‘principles-based’ regulation
was replaced with that of ‘outcome-focused’ regulation.18 The latter suggests a greater focus on the outcomes to be
achieved by the supervised financial institutions rather than mere compliance, although in terms of supervisory
practice the difference between the two appears to be one of form not substance.19 In the following, the interplay
between private standard-setting and public supervision and enforcement in the context of co-regulation and outcome-
focused regulation in the above mentioned sense will be discussed in more detail.
2.1. Private standard-setting
A good illustration of the involvement of private actors in standard-setting within the EU principles-based
regulatory framework that implicitly leaves room for co-regulation can be found in the area of consumer credit. The
Consumer Credit Directive20 currently in force, which remained intact in the wake of the post-crisis financial reforms,
aims at fostering market integration and ensuring a high level of consumer protection in simple unsecured consumer
credit transactions. For this purpose, it obliges Member States, inter alia, to ensure that, before the conclusion of the
credit agreement, the creditor assesses the consumer’s creditworthiness.21 However, this directive does not specify the
criteria on which the consumer’s creditworthiness must be assessed or when the consumer can be considered as
creditworthy. The open-ended nature of the creditor’s duty to assess the consumer’s creditworthiness laid down in this
directive allows Member States considerable leeway in implementing this obligation of EU origin in national laws and
does not preclude them from involving private actors in shaping its content. This is despite the fact that the Consumer
Credit Directive is a full harmonisation measure that formally precludes Member States from maintaining or
introducing in their national laws provisions diverging from those laid down in the directive.22 In practice, therefore,
private actors in some Member States have played a significant role in elaborating the concept of consumer
creditworthiness in simple consumer credit transactions.
This has been the case, for example, in the Netherlands where the national legislator imposed a general duty on
creditors to act as ‘responsible lenders’, so as to prevent consumer overindebtedness; for this purpose, it only obliged
creditors to assess whether the consumer is creditworthy before the conclusion of the credit agreement, and to refuse
granting credit if this is not the case.23 The meaning of this open statutory norm as far as the assessment of the consumer’s
creditworthiness in simple consumer credit transactions is concerned is mainly fleshed out in the codes of conduct of the
three branch organisations: the Code of Conduct of the Netherlands Association of Consumer Finance Companies
(Vereniging van Financieringsondernemingen in Nederland (VFN)), the Consumer Credit Code of the Dutch Banking
Association (Gedragscode Consumptief Crediet van de Nederlandse Vereniging van Banken (NVB)), and the Code of
Conduct of the Dutch Home Shopping Organisation (Gedragscode van de Nederlandse Thuiswinkelorganisatie (NTO)).
All three codes of conduct share the same starting point for assessing whether the consumer is creditworthy and the
provision of credit is thus justified: upon incurring interest- and repayment-related obligations under the credit
agreement, the consumer must still have sufficient means to provide for his or her basic needs and to bear his or her
recurring expenses.24 If this is not the case, providing credit would be considered irresponsible.
Private regulation at Member State level could also play a similar, albeit more limited, role under the newly adopted
Mortgage Credit Directive.25 This post-crisis EU regulatory measure aims to create a Union-wide mortgage credit
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market with a high level of consumer protection. Like the Consumer Credit Directive, the Mortgage Credit Directive
also obliges creditors to assess the consumer’s creditworthiness.26 However, in contrast to the former, the latter
provides more guidance as to how this should be done. This assessment should be thorough and take into account all
necessary and relevant factors which could influence a consumer’s ability to meet his or her obligations under the
credit agreement over its lifetime.27 Such factors include, on the one hand, future payments under the mortgage credit
and other regular expenditure, debts and other financial commitments of the consumer, and, on the other, his or her
income, savings, and assets.28 In addition, reasonable allowance should be made for future events, such as reduction in
income or increase in the borrowing rate.29 The creditworthiness test cannot rely predominantly on the fact that the
value of the property exceeds the amount of the credit or the assumption that the property will increase in value, unless
the purpose of the credit agreement is to construct or renovate the property.30 Besides, in contrast to the Consumer
Credit Directive, which does not deal with the consequences of the negative outcome of the creditworthiness test, the
Mortgage Credit Directive obliges the creditor to refuse granting credit to a consumer in such a case.31
While these provisions of the Mortgage Credit Directive reduce the room for manoeuvre for the Member States and
private regulators in making responsible lending rules for consumer mortgage credit contracts at national level, they do
not altogether preclude co-regulation at national level. All the more so, given that they are subject only to minimum
harmonisation, which allows Member States to maintain or introduce more stringent rules.32 Private actors could thus
still draw up codes of conduct addressing the issue of responsible lending within the regulatory framework established
by the EU legislator in the Mortgage Credit Directive, provided that the national implementing legislation also allows
some leeway for such activities.
Another interesting example of principles-based regulation, or its alter ego, outcome-focused regulation, that leaves
room for private standard-setting is the Treating Customers Fairly (TCF) initiative adopted by the UK Financial
Services Authority (FSA) – the predecessor of the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA).33 This project was initiated in
2001 based on Principle 6 of the FSA’s Handbook of Rules and Guidance requiring firms to ‘treat customers fairly’.
Even though, as we will see below, in the post-crisis period, the FSA did not exclusively rely on the TCF initiative in
pursuing the consumer protection objective, it initiative did not lose its significance and also remains an important
element of the current consumer protection agenda of the FCA. Under this initiative, firms are not subject to specific
rules implementing the TCF principle, but are required to achieve six retail outcomes:34
‘Outcome 1: Consumers can be confident that they are dealing with firms where the fair treatment of customers is
central to the corporate culture.
Outcome 2: Products and services marketed and sold in the retail market are designed to meet the needs of identified
consumer groups and are targeted accordingly.
Outcome 3: Consumers are provided with clear information and are kept appropriately informed before, during and
after the point of sale.
Outcome 4: Where consumers receive advice, the advice is suitable and takes account of their circumstances.
Outcome 5: Consumers are provided with products that perform as firms have led them to expect, and the associated
service is of an acceptable standard and as they have been led to expect.
Outcome 6: Consumers do not face unreasonable post-sale barriers imposed by firms to change product, switch
provider, submit a claim or make a complaint.’
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The focus on such broadly formulated outcomes rather than rigid rules potentially allows financial institutions
considerable leeway in choosing appropriate means to achieve them and developing internal policies to this end.
2.2. Public supervision and enforcement
The involvement of private actors in standard-setting within the EU and/or national principles-based public
regulatory framework for financial services allows public actors to address the problem of the regulator/market
information-asymmetry and to fine-tune a particular regulatory regime in response to the local circumstances.35 The
need for principles-based regulation enabling co-governance of financial services by public and private actors will
only deepen as financial markets become ever more complex across the EU. However, as we will see below, the relative
importance of private standard-setting within a particular public regulatory framework depends, to a large degree, on
the way public and private actors interact with each other. The financial regulators’ approach to supervision and
enforcement may play a crucial role in this context shaping the type of relationship between the two. A cooperative
relationship between financial watchdogs and financial institutions may enhance the significance of and potential for
private standard-setting in practice. Conversely, a more competitive relationship between the two may result in
conflicting norms and substantially reduce the room for private standard-setting.
To illustrate this point, let us return to the two examples of private standard-setting within the EU and national
principles-based regulatory frameworks introduced above. In the first place, it is worth taking a closer look at the
approach by the Netherlands Authority for the Financial Markets (Autoriteit Financie¨le Markten (AFM)) towards
privately produced rules concerning the assessment of the consumer’s creditworthiness in simple consumer credit
transactions implementing the principle of responsible lending. It is notable that the Dutch financial regulator regards
the provisions of the codes of conduct drawn up by the branch organisations with respect to this aspect as minimum
norms for responsible lending.36 If a particular lender is not bound by one of the codes of conduct, it may use other
norms provided that the latter offer the same or higher level of consumer protection. Consequently, the disregard of the
provisions of the codes of conduct by the financial institution when providing credit to consumers may result in the
violation of the statutory rules on responsible lending, regardless of whether the institution is formally bound by a
particular code of conduct or not. In such a case, the Dutch financial supervisory authority may impose administrative
sanctions. In addition, civil courts could follow the norms on responsible lending embodied in the codes of conduct
when interpreting and applying general private law concepts, such as the lender’s duty of care towards its clients.37
Acting contrary to the relevant code of conduct may thus also lead to the lender’s civil liability for the damage suffered
by the consumer as a result of irresponsible lending or trigger other private law consequences. In this way, private
regulation within the statutory framework can be supported by the public and private enforcement mechanisms
provided by the state.
At the same time, as the following case related to consumer mortgage credit shows, public enforcement of the rules
produced by private actors based on principles-based regulation may also pose a particular challenge to building a
cooperative relationship between financial supervisory authorities and financial institutions. In its decision of
24 September 2010,38 the Netherlands Authority for the Financial Markets imposed an administrative penalty in the
amount of s 120.000 on one of the major retail banks operating in the Netherlands – Rabobank – for the breach of
Article 115 of the Business Conduct Supervision (Financial Enterprises) Decree 2006 (Besluit Gedragstoezicht
financie¨le ondernemingen Wft (BGfo)). This provision, which specifies the statutory principle of responsible lending,
obliges creditors to establish and apply criteria for assessing the consumer creditworthiness with a view to preventing
consumer overindebtedness. The meaning of this open-ended norm was further specified in the Mortgage Financing
Code of Conduct (Gedragscode Hypothecaire Financieringen (GHF)) drawn up by the Dutch Banking Association. In
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some cases, this Code of Conduct allowed lenders to deviate from the strict criteria for consumer lending laid down
therein, provided they sufficiently motivated their decision given the specific situation of the consumer. Based on the
respective provisions of the Code of Conduct and the statistical data, the Rabobank formulated its internal rules for
consumer lending. Under these rules, highly educated consumers under the age of 35 who were expected to get the
salary increase could be granted a higher amount of credit than was normally allowed. However, in the view of the
Netherlands Authority for the Financial Markets, this provision was contrary to Article 115 BGfo as specified in the
authority’s own report concerning the quality of advice and transparency in mortgage lending.39 According to this
report, the Rabobank was not allowed to deviate from the normal consumer lending rules based on statistical data; such
a deviation was only permitted based on the data relevant for the specific situation of an individual consumer (such as
the employer’s statement of salary increases). In this way, the Dutch financial supervisory authority deeply interfered
with the bank’s internal policy concerning the prevention of overindebtedness designed to implement the co-
regulatory arrangement. This outcome was reached in the course of public enforcement whereby the administrative
agency not only looked into whether the bank complied with the Mortgage Financing Code of Conduct drawn by the
industry, but also into whether it acted in accordance with the agency’s own guidance.
This case provides a good illustration of the vulnerability of private standard-setting within the public regulatory
framework as interpreted and applied by financial supervisory authorities. What is striking about it is that the open
norm which was elaborated in the code of conduct produced by the industry under the vigilant eye of the financial
supervisory authority was also specified by this authority itself in its formally non-binding guidance. In its
enforcement action, therefore, the financial regulator followed its own interpretation of the code of conduct rather then
the interpretation given to it by the bank. Obviously, such an approach leads to rivalry between public and private
actors and undermines the practical significance of private soft law within the statutory framework. What is more, it
does not make it clear how public soft law produced by administrative agencies and private soft law produced by the
financial services industry relate to each other, impairing legal certainty.
It is also notable in this context that, in the aftermath of the financial crisis, the role of co-regulation in the area of
consumer mortgage credit in the Netherlands has been considerably weakened by the rise of public regulation. The
Dutch government largely replaced the provisions on responsible consumer mortgage lending laid down in the
Mortgage Financing Code of Conduct with much more prescriptive and protective provisions of the delegated act.40
Private regulation in this area enacted within the statutory framework was considered to have failed to provide for a
sufficient level of consumer protection against overindebtedness in the post-crisis era.
Not only private but also public regulation, however, faces difficulties in terms of designing an optimal regulatory
regime. In particular, overprotective public regulation may not perform well in markets characterised by consumer
heterogeneity.41 A related concern is that highly paternalistic public regulation may backfire against the consumers
and thus prove ineffective in practice. Restrictive rules on responsible lending, for example, may prevent consumers
from gaining credit from licensed creditors and force them into the arms of shady lenders, who charge much higher
interest rates.42 In fact, private regulation within the statutory framework may be better equipped to strike the right
balance between freedom and protection, particularly if both financial institutions and consumer associations are
involved in the process of private rule-making. Therefore, the substitution of private regulation in the financial
services field by hard core public regulation and/or public soft law produced by financial watchdogs is not without
risk.43
A similar tension between principles-based regulation, on the one hand, and public supervision and enforcement,
on the other, can be traced in the context of the above-mentioned TCF initiative adopted by the UK FSA. By launching
this outcome-focused project, the FSA wanted financial institutions to focus not on rule-based compliance but on the
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substantive standards required to achieve fair outcomes for retail customers.44 In this way, the FSA aimed to prompt a
step-change in the behaviour of the financial services sector towards retail customers at every stage of a ‘product life-
cycle’, from product design and marketing through to sale. In addition to monitoring the product cycle, the FSA also
developed a ‘TCF culture framework’ to assess the extent to which the financial institutions’ culture was supporting or
impairing their ability to achieve the outcomes pursued by the TCF initiative.45
In fact, this supervisory strategy was based on a considerable degree of trust in the financial services industry
reflected in a largely cooperative relationship between the FSA and the industry in realising statutory objectives.
However, in the aftermath of the financial crisis, the FSA’s trust in financial institutions all but disappeared. In
particular, the large scale mis-selling of payment protection insurance (PPI)46 appeared to suggest that the TCF
initiative was not sufficient to prompt a much needed change in the financial institutions’ treatment of retail customers.
As a result, the outcome-focused TCF initiative was supplemented by a more intrusive rule-based regulation, such as a
ban on commission-driven selling requiring firms to change their business model.47 What is more, the FSA’s approach
to supervision and enforcement also changed post-crisis. The FSA accompanied the TCF initiative by an intensive
approach to enforcement aimed at punishing rather than persuading.48 For example, in 2010, Kensington Mortgage
Company had been fined £1.225 million for breach of the TCF principle in its mortgage business by poorly treating
some customers facing mortgage arrears.49 In addition, the FSA increasingly insisted on compensation for customers,
which by mid-2014 totalled £12.1 billion. All in all, the focus of the UK financial regulator’s supervisory approach
shifted from trusting and cooperating with the financial services sector to pursuing credible deterrence in a more
competitive relationship between the two. As a result, the leeway available for financial institutions in determining
how to treat customers had become more limited. In light of the findings from organisational psychology discussed in
more detail below, however, one may question to what extent outcome-focused regulation can smoothly co-exist with
an active enforcement policy aimed at making the financial services industry afraid.
3. Meta-regulation
In addition to principles-based regulation, the interplay between public and private actors is possible within meta-
regulation. Meta-regulation, also known as management-based regulation, stimulates modes of self-organisation
within financial institutions so as to achieve certain public goals.50 This means that rather than regulating
prescriptively (by telling the regulated entities precisely what measures to take), public regulation only provides an
explicit framework for systems, procedures or controls that must be introduced within financial institutions. While
regulators always rely on financial institutions’ internal systems to ensure compliance, as Black puts it, ‘meta-
regulation simply raises this practical necessity to a conscious regulatory strategy’.51 Under this strategy, public
regulators are to rely upon the senior management of financial institutions to put in place appropriate systems and
oversight mechanisms and to take the necessary measures to ensure that these mechanisms are effective. By
establishing their own systems of internal control and management, financial institutions in their turn could contribute
to the attainment of the specific regulatory objectives pursued by the EU and/or national public regulation.
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3.1. Private governance
Meta-regulation has not been entirely rejected by the EU’s post-crisis reforms. In fact, in some areas, the post-
crisis EU financial services regulation heavily relies on this approach. Thus, for example, the recently adopted
Markets in Financial Instruments Directive II (MiFID II)52 explicitly lays down a new product governance regime
under which product design is to be overseen by senior management with a view to preventing investment firms from
developing dangerous investment products. Thus, the MiFID II obliges management bodies of investment firms to
define, approve and oversee a policy as to such products in accordance with the firms’ risk tolerance and the
characteristics and needs of their clients, including carrying out stress testing, where appropriate.53 In particular,
investment firms that manufacture investment products for sale to clients should maintain, operate and review a
process for the approval of each product or significant adaptations of existing products before they are marketed or
distributed to clients.54 The product approval process should specify an identified target market of end clients for
each product, ensure that all relevant risks to such market are assessed, and that the intended distribution strategy is
consistent  with it.55 ESMA appears ready to play an active role in clarifying the content of these organisational
requirements.56 At the same time, the latter also leave significant room for financial institutions to shape their
governance structures.
Moreover, while some Member States, like Germany, remained cautious about resorting to product governance
without explicit prompting by EU harmonization, other Member States, like the Netherlands and the UK, had already
introduced robust product governance regimes. In the Netherlands, the financial supervision requirements for financial
institutions to have product development and approval processes in place came into force on 1 January 2013.57 The
new product governance regime aims to prevent mass consumer detriment resulting from defective products and it
covers all financial products developed and offered by financial institutions, including investment products. The main
rule is that, when developing a particular financial product, financial institutions should have appropriate procedures
and regulations in place to ensure that balanced consideration has been given to the interests of the consumers of the
financial product and that the financial product is demonstrably the result of this consideration of interests.58 In
particular, the required internal procedures and regulations within financial institutions should delineate a target group
of consumers for the product and to conduct tests to establish that the product performs in a way which does not impair
consumers’ investment objectives.59 In the event that a particular product harms consumer interests, the financial
institutions should adjust the product as quickly as possible, or cease to offer it.60 A similar product governance regime
is also already in place in the UK where it aims to prevent potential consumer detriment before it develops.61
3.2. Public supervision and enforcement
Such open-textured organisational requirements allow regulated financial institutions to shape their governance
structures according to their own needs but in the spirit of the public regulatory regimes, and to engage in self-critical
evaluation about their regulatory performance. Here lies the major strength of meta-regulation compared to traditional
command and control public regulation. This is confirmed by the findings from organisational psychology, in
particular the self-determination theory developed by Deci and Ryan. These authors argue that the optimal human
condition is one where individuals develop both a sense of positive motivation and responsibility; the contextual
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factors that lead to this are those that promote autonomy, feelings of competence, and relatedness.62 Based on these
contextual factors identified by self-determination theory, Rupp and Williams, for example, have argued that when
regulation develops in principles-based fashion, with cooperative relationships between regulator and regulated
becoming part of the regulatory environment, then regulated entities can be expected to engage more deeply with the
values and goals of the particular regulatory instrument than when regulation lays down narrow requirements strictly
regulating their behaviour.63
In my view, this may be particularly true for meta-regulation. By encouraging the financial industry to put in place
effective modes of self-organisation with a view to realising certain public goals, meta-regulation has the potential to
contribute to a cultural re-orientation towards public values within the financial institutions or at least not preclude this
much needed change. Without such cultural change, it is highly doubtful whether more prescriptive public regulation
aimed at ensuring a high level of consumer protection in financial services will be able to realise this goal.
However, yet again, public supervision and enforcement present a major challenge to building a cooperative
relationship between the regulator and the regulated and ensuring the effectiveness of meta-regulation in delivering
public value. The MiFID II enables supervision over the product development processes within the firms by national
financial supervisory authorities and opens up possibilities for regulatory intervention where these processes are not
organised in a manner that promotes the interests of clients and the integrity of the financial market.64 It is notable that
the MiFID II viewed as a whole primarily aims to strengthen the enforcement of the investor protection rules contained
therein through administrative law means by specifying the range of administrative sanctions, including pecuniary
penalties, which should be employed for certain types of breach and how the determination as to the appropriate
sanction and level of sanction should be made.65 In fact, by prescribing punitive administrative sanctions, the MiFID II
significantly limits the room for manoeuvre available for national supervisory authorities when enforcing it through
administrative law means. Coupled with the emergence of ESMA with its far-reaching supervisory powers, this
signifies a tendency towards the growing centralisation of public supervision and enforcement at EU level.
This new trend, however, is not unproblematic when it comes to the administrative enforcement of meta-regulation,
in general, and financial product governance, in particular. Given that the product governance regime under the MiFID
II is still largely untried and insufficiently specific, it is highly questionable to what extent it actually lends itself to
formal enforcement actions with the use of pecuniary penalties and other punitive administrative sanctions as
envisaged in the MiFID II. It is notable in this context that national financial supervisory authorities across the EU do
not exclusively rely on formal enforcement actions against investment firms but increasingly engage in informal
enforcement practices reflecting the idea of cooperation with the industry.66
For instance, in the aftermath of the financial crisis, the Netherlands Authority’s for the Financial Markets formal
enforcement style gave way to more informal forms of intervention into the financial institutions’ business. There was
a growing perception within this administrative agency that formal infringement actions and punitive sanctions would
not always produce desired outcomes in terms of better financial products for consumers.67 Particularly in the area of
product governance, therefore, the Dutch financial regulator now tends to engage in dialogue with the financial
institutions by confronting them with poor product outcomes and allowing them to re-evaluate and adjust their
products given not only the customer’s interest but also their own self-interest. This approach rejects the idea of the
financial supervisory authority imposing its own view on the financial institutions as to what constitutes a good
financial product. Instead, it aims to rebuild trust between financial market participants by effecting a cultural change
within financial institutions that would ensure that such institutions take the customers’ interests seriously when
developing financial products.
Moreover, in view of the diversity in enforcement approaches across national financial supervisory authorities in
the area of investor protection, as well as that in financial markets and products across the EU, imposing a uniform
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public enforcement strategy at EU level may seriously jeopardise the realisation of the regulatory objectives pursued
by the MiFID II, in particular ensuring a high level of investor protection.68 Therefore, it is welcome that ESMA
currently recognises the dangers involved in imposing a uniform enforcement strategy at EU level and appears to be
reluctant to use its formal powers in order to second-guess the choices made by national financial supervisory
authorities with respect to enforcement techniques.69
A related problem is how to ensure the effectiveness of meta-regulation, particularly when the latter is in place
concurrently with prescriptive command and control regulation. This is the case, for example, under the MiFID II
which, in addition to a product governance regime, also comprises a range of product intervention techniques targeted
at potentially dangerous investment products themselves. In particular, national financial supervisory authorities are
given the power to suspend the marketing or sale of investment products where the investment firm has not developed
or applied an effective product approval process as described above.70 Moreover, such authorities may also prohibit,
suspend or restrict the marketing or sale of investment products in or from its Member State where significant investor
protection concerns arise, or a threat is posed to the orderly functioning and integrity of financial markets or to the
stability of the whole or part of the financial system within at least one Member State.71 In addition, ESMA may
intervene in national markets by temporarily prohibiting or restricting the marketing or sale of investment products in
similar circumstances.72 By combining indirect product control through process-based organisational requirements
for investment firms with direct product control and product banning powers in serious cases, the post-crisis EU
regulation aims to prevent potential consumer detriment resulting from the purchase of dangerous investment
products. But can such a combination of regulatory instruments foster a consumer-oriented conduct in accordance with
the principles and purposes of public regulation, not the letter? As Andenas and Chiu aptly put it:
‘Bright line rules and prohibitions often entail a compliance mindset that is focused on the boundary between
what is compliant and not compliant. But meta-regulation requires the application of a different mindset, that of
understanding and willingness to achieve the spirit and purpose of regulatory regimes. Will senior management
be able to embrace the requirements of both types of regulatory regimes?’73
In this context, the role of financial regulators in supervising and enforcing compliance with meta-regulation
becomes particularly important. However, meta-regulation may not be straightforward to enforce, and financial
regulators have accumulated little experience in this area, especially when it comes to product governance
arrangements. Thus, there is a risk that regulators will exercise only passive compliance monitoring. As Hopkins and
Wilkinson have emphasised, however, the regulator’s job under the meta-regulation approach involves actively
challenging the regulated entities to demonstrate that their systems really work in practice.74
This, in my view, could be done more effectively if there is a clear link between organisational frameworks and the
achievement of regulatory outcomes, such as better quality financial products. The Dutch experience – whereby the
financial regulator actively supervises not only the product development processes but also the resulting products –
may provide useful insights for EU regulation, where the link between the two is much less straightforward. The
Netherlands Authority for the Financial Markets assesses the products from the consumer’s perspective based on the
four criteria: (1) cost efficiency (does the product offer value for money?); (2) usefulness (does the product fulfil a
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predefined need of a specific target group of consumers?); (3) safety (does the product do what it is supposed to do in
different scenarios and is the outcome acceptable for the target group?); (4) understandability (is the product not
needlessly complicated and can the consumer adequately judge its quality and suitability for his needs?).75 If the
product fails to meet one or more of these criteria, it can be considered to be harmful for consumers, which can trigger
enforcement action against the financial institution for failure to comply with the relevant financial supervision
requirements.
4. Concluding remarks
The preceding analysis has explored the interplay between private regulators and public supervisors in the post-
crisis European retail financial services landscape. It has shown that, despite the rise of public regulation and
supervision after the crisis, private regulation has not entirely lost its significance in governing financial services in the
EU. The conventional dichotomy between self-regulation by the financial services industry (commonly associated
with its freedom) and public regulation produced by the EU and/or national public authorities (commonly associated
with control over the financial services industry) fails to capture a number of regulatory options which enable the
interface between public and private actors in facing the post-crisis regulatory challenges and which remain open in
the post-crisis period. In particular, such options include principles-based regulation and meta-regulation.
In order to achieve breakthroughs in our understanding of the way in which retail financial markets operate and to
increase the effectiveness of the post-crisis financial services regulation in realizing its goals, public and private actors
need to cooperate with each other. This is particularly true for newly-developing regulatory areas, such as financial
product governance. When co-governing financial services, however, public and private actors often not (only)
cooperate but (also) compete with each other. Which form of the relationship between the two prevails at a specific
moment in time may be considerably influenced by the way in which the compliance of private actors with principles-
based regulation or meta-regulation is supervised and enforced by public watchdogs.
In the post-crisis period, there is evidence of both cooperation and competition between private regulators and
public supervisors across the EU, in general, and within specific jurisdictions, in particular. In the UK, for example, in
the wake of the crisis the supervisor’s trust in financial institutions operating in the retail financial market gave way to
credible deterrence and the rhetoric of ‘be afraid’. In contrast, in the Netherlands, the emphasis in the supervisory
approach shifted towards more dialogue and less confrontation with the retail financial services industry.
The problem with a predominantly competitive relationship between private regulators and public watchdogs fed
by mutual distrust is that it may severely undermine the practical significance of co-governance arrangements. This
may lead, in particular, to the substitution of private soft law by public soft law and only passive compliance
monitoring. Therefore, a significant degree of trust and cooperation between private regulators and public supervisors
is key to making the co-governance arrangements work in practice.
In order to ensure a cooperative relationship between public and private actors in standard-setting and enforcement,
states must become, to use the words of Van Waarden, ‘responsive to regulatory initiatives of markets and civil society
and vice versa, with responses varying from banning or blocking, to support or even adoption.’76 In particular, what is
needed are responsive public supervision and enforcement, i.e. supervision and enforcement that would be responsive
to the peculiarities of co-governance arrangements, with due regard to such rule of law values as legal certainty and
equal treatment.77 How such responsive public supervision and enforcement in European retail financial services law
can be shaped is an important question for further research.
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